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Working Time, Industrial Relations
and the Employment Relationship
Jill Rubery, Kevin Ward, Damian Grimshaw 
and Huw Beynon
ABSTRACT. This article explores the erosion of the standard 
working-time model associated with the UK’s voluntarist system of
industrial relations, and argues that its renegotiation is likely to be a
critical factor in shaping the employment relationship of the future.
As numerous studies over the last two decades have revealed, 
organizations have increasingly seen ‘time’ as a variable that can be
manipulated to increase productivity or expand service provision,
through making workers work harder, longer or according to 
management demands. These studies have also drawn our attention
to the wider consequences of the increasing demands that organiza-
tions place on their employees in the name of ‘flexibility’, impacting
both on what workers do while at work and how they organize and
plan the other aspects of their lives. This article brings together two
literatures, one on time and the other on industrial relations, and 
suggests that new working-time arrangements are changing the
wage-effort bargain and blurring the previously clearly demarcated
boundary between work and non-work time. Drawing on qualitative
fieldwork in six large UK-based organizations, we argue that there 
is evidence of a move towards a new ‘temporality’ based on an
employer-led model of working time, which differs significantly
from both the traditional UK system of working-time regulation 
and that found in Continental Europe. KEY WORDS • employment
relationship • intensification of work • non-working time • organiza-
tional change • working time
Introduction
It is hardly possible to pick up a newspaper or to turn on the radio without hear-
ing something about the relationship between time and work: from the growth
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in 24-hour opening among food retailers to the expansion of part-time work,
from the withdrawal of ‘bonuses’ for unsocial working to the pronouncements
of the need to balance ‘work’ and ‘life’. All these issues have risen up the 
UK political and the policy agenda in the last decade as a consequence of the
time demands that organizations increasingly appear to place on those who
work for them. While there is no consensus on the extent of the changes and
their implications for those who experience them, there is some agreement that
the organization and regulation of working time in industrialized economies has
changed in quite far-reaching ways (OECD, 1995; Bosch, Dawkins and
Michon, 1994; Bosch, 1999; Boulin and Hoffman, 1999; Casey et al., 1997;
Hochschild, 1997; Lehndorff, 1998; Rubery, 1998a; Harkness, 1999; Harvey,
1999; Green, 2001; Kalleberg and Epstein, 2001; Tietze and Musson, 2002).
This work has also increasingly pointed to how changes in working-time
arrangements have potentially wider implications than ‘just’ the restructuring of
the hours of work. Negotiations over ‘time’ and its meaning were at the heart of
the standard employment relationship, protected by trade unionism and collec-
tive bargaining arrangements (Thompson, 1967). Under the industrial order
‘time spent at work was experienced as time allocated to the employer in
exchange for a wage, while time spent in the private sphere was experienced as
“free”’ (Everingham, 2002: 338). The current renegotiation of ‘time’ has the
potential to bring about major changes in the organization of the wider society
and in the nature of the employment relationship, with some going as far to
claim that what we have witnessed in recent years across the most industrialized
nations is the end of social time (Probert, 1997) and ‘the end of any distinction
between social and unsociable hours of work’ (Everingham, 2002: 346). In this
vein, Harvey (1999) (drawing on Thompson’s earlier work) has referred to the
idea of ‘changing temporalities’ (pp. 22–3; see also Glucksmann, 1998), where
‘the restructuring of employment relations can be viewed as a restructuring of
the temporalities of work’.
This article addresses this argument by seeking to understand the rationales
behind, and the implications of, the ways in which some large organizations are
changing how they allocate and organize work over the day, week, month and
even, in some cases, the year. In the second section of this article we set out three
modes, or ‘types’ of working-time organization that have emerged in industrial-
ized economies, as a means of examining the direction and form of recent
changes. The third section outlines the organizations in which we conducted
fieldwork and the methods we used. In the fourth section we draw upon empirical
material to examine the many ways organizations are demanding that workers
work longer, harder, and more flexibly across time and consider what the conse-
quences are for the work experiences of different occupational groups. Finally,
we consider the factors that have influenced the timing of these changes and
reflect on their likely implications for the future of the employment relationship.
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Three Modes of Organizing Working Time
It is clear that ‘time’ played a central role in the constitution of the employment
relationship that emerged as part of mass industrialization, in which temporal
boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’ life were created as part of the ‘social
compromise. . . in the political sphere between organized labour and capital’
(Everingham, 2002: 339). This relationship differentiated between ‘paid time’,
for which employees received financial compensation – the wage – and ‘free’
time, available to use at one’s discretion.1 As could be anticipated, this ‘com-
promise’ was reached in different parts of the world at different times – as a
model it evolved unevenly – and the terms of the exchange varied according to
regulatory, institutional and customary norms and practices.
From a ‘time’ perspective though what is important is how the standard
employment relationship placed time-related limits on: (a) the relationship
between the wage (or the total reward package) that workers received, and the
effort or labour required in order for them to ‘earn’ the wage and other rewards;
and (b) the share of the day, week or year that was under the control of the
employer. By establishing standard working days, defined by hours not output,
employers could only set tasks that could be performed in the allotted time.
Moreover, by establishing the principle of continuous working days, based
around full-time employment, employers were constrained in their use of 
working-time schedules to maximize work intensity. The divide between 
standard hours and non-standard hours further constrained employers as
employees at a minimum needed to be compensated by extra payments to 
give up ‘free’ time, particularly if the hours worked were at times regarded by
wider society as being particularly unsocial. Reference in labour law to working
time ‘limits the employer’s hold on the worker’s life’ (Supiot, 2001: 60), and
distinguishes an employment relationship from a slave or ownership contract.
Yet the division may be clearer under some employment relationships than
under others. According to Supiot, and as we have already begun to suggest, one
of the features of the industrial system was to make a clear distinction between
what he calls ‘subordination time’ and ‘free time’ (p. 64; see also Adam, 1990;
Everingham, 2002). Those conditions that tend to sharpen this divide include:
1. Pay and rewards linked to time; 
2. Work for the employer outside standard or contractual hours done only on a
voluntary basis and with advance warning; 
3. Work space and personal space clearly separated (as in the ‘home’ as private
and the ‘workplace’ as public); 
4. Non-standard work time clearly identified through wage enhancements
(such as high hourly rates for Saturday and Sunday working) and; 
5. Regular scheduling of working hours to facilitate the planning of private
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activities, such as performing domestic duties, or organizing leisure activi-
ties, without risk of disruption.
Despite the long-term apparent consensus to respect the time-based limits of
the standard employment relationship, the wage–effort bargain and the division
between work and non-work time are inherently contested aspects of the
employment relationship. Employers or managers tend, ceteris paribus, to seek
to maximize effort relative to wage costs and to extend their control over the
deployment of labour time. So, the growth of what has been termed in the media
the ‘24/7 economy’ or of ‘flexi-time’ arrangements constitute efforts by
employers to extend the times of the day, week and year when they can ask staff
to work, and to use this new ‘flexibility’ to schedule the work when for them it is
most productive. As a result of this expansion of when workers might work, new
fault-lines have been opened up around the balancing of non-paid and paid
work. For trade unions the control of the time dimensions of the employment
relationship is recognized to be critical, both for the well-being of their members
and for establishing bargaining leverage (Hinrichs et al., 1991).
Table 1 sets out three alternative scenarios for how the time within the
employment relationship may be organized and regulated. The first scenario –
or mode – represents a pure employer-led model, unconstrained by state regula-
tion or trade unions. As such, it represents perhaps the conditions which
employers may be striving towards and which employees are seeking to protect
themselves against, although of course this model may never be realized. The
consequences for the organizing of the time worked by workers is the require-
ment to be completely flexible, such as in the case of ‘zero-hour’ contracts,
when work is scheduled according to the needs of employers, and without any
attention to the needs, preferences or desires of workers. Two different modes
of flexibility may be sought by employers: the first involves the scheduling of
work across the available 24/7 and annual time cycles to match available labour
to demand, thereby reducing overhead costs and maximizing work intensity,
particularly if labour can be purchased in small blocks of discontinuous time.
This fragmented system leads to intensive effort in comparison to the ‘extensive
effort’ (Green, 2001) in jobs where workers are required to work until tasks are
completed. Moreover, employers may be able to extract even more extensive
effort if presence in the workplace is taken as an indicator of general ‘commit-
ment’ (Simpson, 1997). The second method of employer flexibility is to set the
job tasks to be performed and the associated reward package independently of
specified work time – a results-based employment relationship in contrast to the
time-dependent, means-based relationship (Supiot, 2001: 83). In this case the
time at work becomes an output of the employment relationship dependent,
inter alia, on the workload, on responsibilities for work co-ordination and on the
individual competence or efficiency of the employee.
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The second and third columns represent alternative modes of regulating the
time dimension of the employment relationship, in which the interests of labour
are protected in different ways and to different extents (Donaldson, 1996). The
second column represents the continental European approach, where many
European trade union movements have sought to control maximum working
hours and have placed great store by their rights to ‘free time’ (Supiot, 2001).
For example, one of the major achievements of German trade unions in the
1960s and 1970s was to introduce the ‘free Saturday’ where through collective
agreements they were able to limit Saturday working, in addition to the free
Sunday, guaranteed by legal regulation . This ‘time’ was then available to 
workers to attend to other aspects of their lives. Most European countries set
maximum working hours and maximum overtime hours and expect extra hours
to be taken as time off in lieu rather than as paid working hours (Anxo and
O’Reilly, 2000). Many of the limitations on working hours are reinforced by
both collective and legal regulation.
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TABLE 1
Three modes of organizing working time
Time dimensions European Traditional UK 
to the employment Employer-led industrial industrial relations 
relationship model relations model model
Time and the Tailor hours to Control standard Control effort levels
wage–effort  demand to maximize hours and overtime through job
relationship productive effort; or hours to limit total demarcation and
delink wages and amount of effort protection of   
hours to maximize provided. Part-time standard hours to  
total labour provided.  work resisted as maximize total hours  
threat to standard of paid labour;  
contract. promote overtime at 
premium rates.  
Permissive attitude   
towards part-time 
work. 
Work/non- Deploy labour as and Voluntary and Voluntary protection
work time when required over legal protection of of standard hours,
boundaries the 24-hour day, standard hours, premia rates,
week, year. premia rates, holiday entitlement
holiday entitlement  but extra hours and
and restrictions on unsocial hours
total hours and days accepted at extra
of work, such as remuneration.
policy of free 
Sunday.
The third column of Table 1 presents the traditional way in which the time
that staff work in the UK has been regulated. This has involved establishing and 
protecting the notion of ‘standard working hours’, notionally for most workers,
‘9–5’, but not the regulation of total working hours. Provided the extra hours
were rewarded at appropriate rates, in the form of higher hourly rates for
evening or weekend work, British trade unions have by and large welcomed
overtime opportunities. For some, lower-paid workers, working overtime meant
earning a living wage. As a result the UK industrial relations system has for a
number of years consisted of the opportunity for workers to work extra paid
hours, in the form of overtime or extra shifts, sometimes as a means of making
up the total wage and compensating for the relatively low hourly rates. The role
of campaigns to reduce standard working hours in the UK has thus been
ambiguous, with employers interpreting the claims as a wage-bargaining
strategy rather than a genuine campaign to reduce actual hours of work. As
such, employers in the past have tied any reduction in standard hours to efforts
to increase productivity within standard hours (White, 1980; Blyton, 1992;
1995).
The strategy on part-time work also varies between the continental and the
British modes of working-time regulation. Many European trade union move-
ments have historically been very wary of the development of part-time work,
identifying it as a threat to the standard employment contract (Daune-Richard,
1998) by encouraging fragmentation. However, where part-time work has been
developed on a large scale it has been integrated into the system of legal and
collective regulation. A good example of this is in the Netherlands, where 
part-time work does not necessarily equate with poorer pay and terms and 
conditions. British trade unions have perhaps been less sensitive to possible
threats to their ability to regulate the employment relationship arising from the
development of part-time work (Daune-Richard, 1998). However, this neglect
of the part-time issue led to the development, in the highly deregulated labour
market of the 1980s, of highly marginalized forms of part-time working within
the UK (Maier, 1994; O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998; Rubery, 1998b). Under the 
rising awareness of gender equality issues, interest in regulating part-time work
and conditions has grown, spurred on by developments in EU-wide regulations
designed to gain the support of continental European unions for the promotion
of flexible working. However, EU regulations have not addressed the develop-
ment of more fragmented and variable scheduling of part-time work and instead
have concentrated on ensuring that part-timers receive the same terms and con-
ditions as full-time workers. This approach allows part-time work to set new
norms for flexible deployment and scheduling that may have spill-over effects
on some full-time workers, as we explore later (Rubery, 1998b).
The consequences of each of the regulatory models for actual working time,
pay and employment contracts are outlined in the Table 2. There are some clear
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similarities between the employer-led and the traditional UK regulatory models.
Both generate long working hours, a high frequency of unsocial hours working
and high part-time use. There are also notable differences, in particular with
respect to the incidence of paid overtime, the protection of the notion of ‘stan-
dard hours’ working and the protection of employer-based benefits covering
non-work time. It is in this context of both similarities and differences that we
can explore the extent to which UK employers are changing the ways in which
they regulate ‘time’, and all that this implies for workers. For as firms move
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TABLE 2
The consequence of the three modes of working time
Time dimensions European Traditional UK 
to the employment Employer-led industrial industrial relations 
relationship model relations model model
Employment 
outcomes 
Hours Long hours for Standard hours for Long hours for full-
salaried full-timers full-timers; timers based on paid
combined with short overtime hours  overtime plus short
hours contracts/ taken mainly as    hours contracts.
variable shifts/split time off in lieu.   Limited use of time
shifts and so on. Part-time work use  off in lieu.
limited and/or  
subject to 
restrictions.
Pay Minimum use of Low level of paid High level of paid
paid overtime and overtime but overtime, high level
unsocial hours and unsocial hours and of unsocial hours
overtime premia. overtime premia and overtime premia.
Limited employment maintained.  Employment-related
related benefits. High level of benefits provided 
employment-related selectively
benefits often dependent upon
backed by legal employer and
rights/state provision. contract status. 
Contracts High use of  Use of open-ended Use of open-ended 
temporary contracts,  standard employment standard 
short part-time work   contracts. Part-time employment 
to reduce overhead work contracts contracts but
costs/maximize subject to restrictions also use of part-time
productivity. or  protection. contracts on a more
variable basis. 
away from the traditional UK regulatory model towards an employer-led model
– tempered to some extent by EU regulations influenced by the continental
European model – we may be witnessing the emergence of a new ‘temporality’,
and as part of it new time rhythms in wage work and beyond. To assess the ways
in which these changes are actually being introduced, and the consequences for
the temporal ordering of everyday work life, we turn in the next section to our
case-study organisations.
A Study of Working-time Change through Case Studies
Research rationale
While the amount of research in the UK on the ways in which working time is
organized and regulated has grown in line with the expansion of time-specific
employment contracts, there is not yet any consensus over the extent of the
changes in the mode of temporal regulation. Some research has emphasized the
continuing influence of sector level bargaining and traditions on working-time
arrangements (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 1999), while Gall (1996) has questioned
whether annualized hours schemes are actually that common across UK organi-
zations. This contrasts with analyses that stress the development and normaliza-
tion of ‘flexible working’ arrangements (Neathey and Hurstfield, 1996; Casey
et al., 1997), the decline of collective regulation of working time (Blyton, 1994;
1995; Beatson, 1995) and the increasing encroachment of work time on per-
sonal time (Lewis, 1997; Clark-Campbell, 2000; Fagan, 2001). While there is
some disagreement over the extent to which ‘new’, more flexible arrangements
are really transforming the standard employment relationship, the evidence on
the amount of time UK workers spend working is more clear-cut: national 
statistics indicate a trend towards more men and women working long hours
(Harkness, 1999; Fagan, 2001; Green, 2001). In itself this evidence could
support either the continuation of the traditional UK model or the rise of
employer-led working time (Blyton, 1994; Rubery et al., 1998; Kodz et al.,
1998; Fagan, 2001).
One way of understanding the context and the meaning of the changes to
working-time arrangements is through extensive qualitative research at different
workplaces. Case studies of this kind have highlighted the impact of changes in
working time – generally in the name of ‘flexibility’ – upon power relations, on
the ways in which ‘work’ and ‘free’ time bleed into one another, and on the
ways in which the employment relationship is institutionalized (Rubery and
Horrell, 1993; Heyes, 1997; Harvey, 1999). However, these studies have often
relied on evidence from a single case (Bacon and Storey, 1996; Heyes, 1997), a
single sector, usually in manufacturing or construction (Blyton, 1995; Harvey,
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1999) or have been selected as cases precisely because something interesting
appeared to be happening around working time (Curson, 1986; Rubery and
Horrell, 1993). As such, this article does something different: it draws on 
material generated through semi-structured interviews at organizations not 
chosen as cases on the basis that they were in the throes of introducing changes
in the organization of working time.
The case-study organizations: an introduction
The six large service sector organizations – two in the public and four in the 
private sector – were visited during 1998 and 1999 (see Appendix) and each, as
might be expected, had a history of the collective regulation of working time.
Our case-study organizations were chosen for analysis as part of a larger project
concerned with the overall management of employment change (Beynon et al.,
2002). Although we were aware that the reorganizing of when staff worked was
likely to be an issue for some workers in some of the organizations, we were
surprised at what we found when we visited workplaces. Managers and workers
both wanted to talk about ‘working time’: at some sites it was the issue. Even at
those workplaces where the organization of working time had been largely
untouched for a number of decades, we were left in no doubt by managers that
change was around the corner, that workers would be required to change when
they worked and that they would not receive the same rewards they might tradi-
tionally have expected to have received for working evenings of weekend, or at
different times from one week to the next.
The six organizations in our study consisted of two large public sector 
organizations – a city council (Councilco) and a large hospital trust (Healthco) –
and four private sector organizations – a large food supermarket chain
(Retailco), a medium-sized bank (Bankco), a large telecommunications com-
pany (Telecomco) and a medium-sized media company (Mediaco). The key
features of the six organizations and the workplaces studied within these organi-
zations are outlined in the Appendix at the end of this article. Information on
changes in working-time arrangements was obtained through semi-structured
interviews with managers (both head office or regional managers in the case 
of national organizations and line managers of the workplaces studied) and
through shorter semi-structured interviews with employees who performed the
range of tasks carried out at the workplaces. Overall we held 41 interviews with
higher-level managers and 226 interviews with lower managerial/supervisory
and non-managerial employees. We also interviewed the key trade union 
officials responsible for collective negotiations at each of the organizations.
These three sources of information, combined with the documentary material
provided by the organizations and articles identified in the press, provided us
with an overlapping series of perspectives on how working time was organized
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at each workplace, and across each of the organizations more generally. We
now turn to explore our two main themes: the change to the time structuring 
of the wage–effort bargain and the blurring of ‘work’ and ‘free’ time at each
organization.
Changes to Working Time
In this section we present and discuss our findings from our organization 
studies. In the first part we document how in two ways employers were using
‘time’ as a means of changing the wage–effort relationship and consider the
implications of these changes for the experience of work and time. In particular,
we explore how changes in time resulted in intensification for some groups of
workers, while for others time was extended and employers constructed vari-
able time inputs that were perceived as providing a ‘solution’ to managing
increased tasks and responsibilities at work. From our conversations with 
managers and workers it was clear that the implications of these changes did not
stop when workers left their place of work. In the second part of this section we
turn to the different ways in which organizations were changing what was
meant by ‘standard hours’, and consider what workers felt was a clear – and
financially unrewarded – intrusion into what had previously been their ‘free’
time.
Time and the restructuring of the wage–effort bargain
At each workplace we visited, managers and workers were clear: working-time
policies had been used to restructure the wage–effort relationship in two distinct
but related ways. First, for those on time-related contracts staff had to do more
during their hours of work. The tempo of work was increasing as the mix of
‘active’ and ‘non-active’ periods was adjusted so that many of the workers
found themselves working ‘flat out’ for many of their hours of work. Second,
those on ‘results-based’ contracts, such as those on supervisory or managerial
grades, were being required to work both harder and longer, to stay at work, or
work from home, to get the job done. Moreover, more staff, at relatively low
levels of the organizational hierarchy, were being expected to ‘go the extra
mile’ to provide additional time input as part of their expected normal duties. In
both cases what we found was that time was being used as a means of securing
greater effort for the same reward whether extracted through an intensification
of work or a prolongation of working hours.
We found five different strategies being adopted by the organizations at the
workplaces we visited that used working time to increase the intensity of work: 
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1. A greater use of ‘flexible scheduling’ for both full- and part-timers to target
the hours worked when demand for services was predicted to be greatest (for
example, at Councilco, managers formed a number of home care worker
teams that had to work flexible schedules to meet the needs of those recently
released from hospital, with no regard to the preferences of workers to work
the same hours each week in order that they could plan non-work activities); 
2. The expectation that staff would take overtime as time off in lieu in the 
context of declining staff levels relative to demand (for example, journalists
at Mediaco were no longer paid for the overtime they worked but instead had
to take time off in lieu at ‘slack times’, even though the reduction of staff
numbers made this very difficult to do in practice); 
3. The cutting of the ‘core hours’ for part-timers (for example, Telecomco
reduced part-timers’ hours from five to four hours a day to reduce paid
breaks and Councilco reduced the core hours of school dinner staff, who
therefore often worked only for two or three hours over lunchtime) and the
reduction of break times or the complete elimination of breaks, as part of a
shortening of the number of hours staff worked on any one day (for example,
Retailco eliminated paid breaks); 
4. The extension of ‘operating hours’ – that is when workplaces were staffed
and workers were expected to be able to work – without an increase in staff
numbers (for example at Mediaco’s print works the operating hours were
extended and the number of men per shift were reduced, with a rotating shift
used to eliminate paid overtime); and
5. The linking of time schedules – that is when staff worked – to tighter job
specifications, so that what individual staff were responsible for doing on a
particular day or during a shift was transparent.
These different strategies had a radical impact on the traditional wage–effort
relationship across the six organizations. The first form of change involved the
intensification of work for those on time-related contracts. Our fieldwork at
Councilco was revealing. We spoke to the predominantly female home-care
workers and school catering workers who were paid by the hour and who had
experienced a change in when they worked. Not only was the ‘porosity’, or
what Supiot (2001) terms the paid ‘on-the-job inactivity’ reduced, but paid
overtime, which some workers used to compensate for the relatively low hourly
rate, was effectively abolished. The reasons that managers gave for this re-
scheduling of hours was that it was necessary in order to match the new require-
ments of the job, where workers were being expected to take on extra tasks and
to meet much clearer indicators of performance in the context of a reduction in
staff numbers. As one worker explained to us:
It’s run more like a business. . . whereas before you’d go in and it was like a more
friendly basis. You’d go in and you’d do what was required of you and then [the
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patients] want the company, cup of tea, sit down and have a chat whereas you
can’t do that now because time’s money, you can’t do that. (Female part-time No.
4, Councilco)
In addition, while we were carrying out our research, Councilco invoked for the
first time a clause in the employment contracts of home-care workers that had
been introduced in 1984. All home care workers were required to be available to
work any time from 8am to 8pm, as part of ‘standard hours’. What this meant
for the workers we interviewed, many of whom had chosen the job precisely
because the hours of work fitted around their other activities, such as dropping
off and picking up children, or when a partner or spouse worked, was a need to
reassess how they organized their lives. The effect of these changes at work was
to compromise the often carefully constructed temporal order of workers, who
had to respond to changes at work by rearranging the timing of other aspects of
theirs and their dependants’ lives.
The different working-time strategies generated a second form of change to
the wage–effort relation – the development of ‘results-based’ contracts where
hours varied according to the task assigned rather than according to standard
working weeks. We found evidence that organizations were reclassifying jobs
as either ‘supervisory’ or ‘managerial’ as a means of moving staff off ‘time-
based’ contracts. This had the effect in our case-study organizations of increas-
ing the proportion of the workforces who could be expected to work longer
hours or to work at unsocial times of the day, night or week and not expect to
receive any paid overtime. Increased hours for managers or supervisors were
often associated with the extension of operating hours, as in banks extending the
hours over which they will deal with customer queries, and/or with the reduc-
tion in staff numbers, so that managers had to work to ensure that targets and
outputs, on which they would be judged, were reached. For example, Retailco
managers had to be prepared to work as and when required outside of their 
contracted hours:
We [lower-level managers] do five days a week [but] some weeks we work six
days a week. . . I don’t always get a dinner hour, I don’t always get out on time 
. . . sometimes on the shop floor we could do a 13/14 hour-day. (Female full-time
No. 1, Retailco)
Even relatively low-level managers found themselves under increased pressure
to work more hours, either longer days or on days when their time was normally
‘free’. At Healthco, porter managers were in principle given contracts for 37
hours a week but received no extra pay for the regular overtime they worked.
Aside from the implications of this extra working for their personal lives, this
also meant that often the porter managers’ hourly rates were lower than those of
their juniors. At Councilco we found relatively low-paid school meals super-
visors putting in extra, unpaid overtime hours each week. When questioned
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about why they were working extra hours, in the context of what appeared to be
a devaluing of many of the things that they used to do, they responded in a 
number of ways. They felt a loyalty to the pupils and the other staff they worked
with, and also, often a more ideological or philosophical commitment to some
sort of public service ethos. In principle these ‘extra hours’ could be taken as
time off in lieu, but, perhaps because of the realities of the conditions under
which most staff worked, most of the time this right was not exercised:
It’s changed because in September we started on breakfasts so my hours start now
at 7.15am officially till quarter to three because that’s seven hours but I don’t go
home at that time because my work is not finished. So I can’t go home before it’s
finished plus the staff are normally still here. . . I start to go about fourish. (Female
part-time No. 3, Councilco)
The apparent ‘need’ to work extra hours stemmed from the decision by man-
agers to introduce more flexible schedules for the supervised staff, so that fewer
staff worked at any one time, but there were staff working over more of the day
and the week. The knock-on effect was to extend the amount of time that super-
visors were expected to work, while the number of supervisory staff remained
unchanged. A home-care supervisor at Councilco identified a similar trend:
It’s Monday to Friday at the moment. That’s another thing that may be changing.
The home care staff are now going on to rotas which will be from eight in the
morning till eight at night. So the organizers are going to have to come on line.
(Female part-time No. 7, Councilco)
This apparent understanding by workers of the need to work more hours with no
extra pay was achieved largely through the promotion of a view within the 
organizations we visited that long hours went with the job; they were inevitable:
as a female manager at Telecomco commented in relation to her 12-hour day: 
‘. . . it just goes with the territory’ (Female full-time No. 1, Telecomco). In some
senses what we were picking up in our research was the playing out of wider
trends in the working-time patterns of UK workers, and their expectations about
what is required of them by employers in the name of ‘flexibility’.
What made both these types of change particularly pronounced is that, as we
have mentioned already, organizations were not only asking workers to change
when they worked but were also changing and often removing the payments
workers received when working ‘unsocial hours’. Of course, that these two 
strategies should be pursued simultaneously is not altogether surprising: quite
simply, it is unlikely that any of the organizations we studied would have imple-
mented the changes they made to when staff worked were it not for the treatment
of all hours as exactly the same, regardless of when they fell over the day or 
week. While each organization set about enacting the reduction or withdrawal of
unsocial payments in its own way, we found clear evidence of the dismantling of
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long-standard understandings of the relationship between the pay workers receive
and when they work. For Everingham (2002) this is just one example of the more
widespread ‘de-regulation of the workplace’. As she puts it:
The de-regulation of temporal boundaries has. . . insidious ways of penetrating the
remnants of our familial and communal space. No longer protected by the collec-
tively achieved temporal boundaries of the 8-hour day, workers are exposed
directly and individually to the logic of market and its drive for greater and greater
productivity. (p. 346)
It was at Mediaco that we found the most extreme case of this: unsocial pay-
ments were eliminated by what one worker described as a ‘heavy-handed’ and
wide-ranging restructuring of the employment relationship that involved, inter
alia, the loss of overtime and of any extra pay for working on bank holidays. At
the other organizations we studied the changes to premia were achieved through
less direct and incremental means. Retailco followed others in its sector in 
abolishing premia for Saturday work in 1995 and setting night rate premia at a
lower flat rate level in 1996–7. It did, though, retain the double time premia 
for Sunday work. Telecomco redefined standard hours for both engineers and
clerical staff to extend further into the evening so that no premia were paid for
work scheduled between 8am and 8pm, Monday to Saturday. Bankco initially
retained its premia rates when it opened its first call centre in the early 1990s. 
It did this as a means of guaranteeing the terms and conditions to workers 
redeployed from elsewhere in the organization. However, when recruiting new
employees to staff its second call centre in 1996, it took the opportunity to
reduce premia. By 1999 the differences in terms and conditions at the two call
centres were causing industrial relations problems: the reaction of management
was to harmonize the premia for all staff at a level between the standard and the
second call centre rates.
At the two public sector organizations – Councilco and Healthco – manage-
ment was constrained by national collective bargaining agreements in a way
that its private sector equivalents were not. Rather than directly remove any
extra payment for unsocial working, managers at these two organizations were
innovative in working out how best to circumvent existing arrangements.
Healthco, in common with many NHS trusts, had set up a new staff grade of
health-care assistant outside of the Whitley terms and conditions, which struc-
tured the hourly rates for nursing staff. For the health-care assistants, while
weekend premia were retained at the Whitley level, night premia were not.
Also, where weekend or night work was introduced for new groups of staff (for
example in the rehabilitation directorate), new contracts were offered at higher
basic salary levels to staff but without provision for any additional premia.
Temporary and part-time workers were also used to cover the unsocial hours
and overtime hours as a means of avoiding having to pay extra to existing full-
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time workers. This policy of circumvention was made possible through the use
of the ‘bank’ (an agency supplying nursing staff, many of whom are also full-
time NHS employees) to cover overtime hours without premia payments. This
practice was increasingly being used at Healthco – as part of a national growth
in the use of agency staff in the health sector – as permanent staff vacancies
were left unfilled. Very similar strategies were adopted at Councilco, including
the use of casual, temporary and part-time staff where no premia was paid; for
example, all summer seasonal work in the leisure department was now covered
this way and the use of these types of workers was increasing in home care to
cover the increasing unsocial hours working associated with Care in the
Community policies. As with the rehabilitation centre at Healthco, where high-
er basic salaries were offered in return for commitments to work flexibly and to
cover unsocial hours, Councilco set up teams of home-care workers on higher
basic salaries but with no premia attached to provide the flexible and 24-hour
cover needed to assess patients recently released from hospital.
What this section has revealed are the ways in which the organizations we
studied had gone about demanding workers change when they work, with very
little regard for the other tasks and commitments workers have outside of their
place of work. As a result more and more men and women are finding that their
work patterns put them out of synchrony with the temporal order of friends and
families (La Valle et al., 2002; Dex, 2003). Our findings also point to the
accompanying intensification of activity levels when workers are at work.
Together these changes have quite fundamentally restructured the work–effort
relationship that characterized many industrialized economies post-World War
II. Moreover, both these changes have taken place at the same time as organiza-
tions have removed the financial payments received for working in ‘free’ time.
In the next section we turn to the second theme our research explores, that is the
gradual blurring of work/non-work time.
Blurring work/non-work time
At each of our case-study organizations we found that the institutional mecha-
nisms that serve to divide ‘standard’ work, or public time and ‘free’, or private
time had either been dismantled or eroded. All the organizations had extended
operating and/or opening hours, thereby requiring a greater proportion of the
workforce to work outside what had previously been regarded as the normal or
standard hours. The reduction or elimination of pay premia for ‘non-standard’
times allowed employers greater freedom to schedule work at no extra financial
cost to themselves, although of course, and as we have already suggested, the
wider social costs are not inconsequential. It was also clear from what workers
said to us that there were work-based costs to moving to work evenings or at
weekends. They claimed that having to change when they worked was increas-
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ing the stress they felt under while at work, and was even affecting them during
leisure or ‘free’ hours.
Our research found that, in each organization we visited, managers were 
justifying and explaining the removal of the temporal boundary in terms of 
pressures to meet the needs of customers (Fuller and Smith, 1991; Beynon et al.,
2002). When pushed in interviews, managers made it clear that they no longer 
operated the principle, associated with the standard employment relationship, of
fitting work, wherever possible, within the confines of standard work hours, even
though this principle had by and large underpinned past practice at each of the
organizations. In particular we were struck by the rationale offered to us by 
managers in the public sector. According to this group, the pressures to mimic the
private sector in their organization of work and to satisfy the growing audit
requirements that they and their departments were under were behind the effort
invested in blurring the distinction between social and unsocial working hours
(see also, Power, 1997; Probert, 1997; McCammon and Griffin, 2000; Evering-
ham, 2002). As one senior health manager observed in an interview: ‘if “Retailco”
provides a 24-hour service to sell baked beans to customers, then we ought to con-
sider giving patients a 24-hour service.’ At all of the organizations we found the
notion of protected and standard hours being challenged and evidence of the clear
assertion of managerial prerogative in the deployment of labour.
Unlike all the other organizations we visited, on the face of it Bankco was at
least trying to observe some notion of standard hours. According to workers and
to managers, the organization did try to listen to individuals’ preferences over
when they wanted to work, although even here some employees claimed that if
they asked to change their shifts or to move to part-time hours, the trade-off
would be that they would have to work some Saturdays. Nevertheless, it was
clear that Bankco was making an effort to identify on a regular basis anyone
who needed to change hours because of personal reasons and to do its best to
meet those needs.
At the other five case studies, where there was some attempt to respond to the
needs or preferences of the individual, it came in the form of informal swap
arrangements, often conducted with immediate colleagues. In practice these
proved difficult to organize: ‘if there was somebody willing to swap, but when
you are only getting one weekend off every three weeks, who wants to swap
their weekend off?’ (Male full-time No. 3, Councilco).
Similarly, rights to time off in lieu could also be difficult to exercise because of
work pressures, and managers could be required, for example at Retailco, to work
a schedule which changed every day and, moreover, ‘could be changed at any-
time, should someone ring in sick and need cover. So you need to be flexible’
(Female full-time No. 1, Retailco). The intrusions into private and family life
were clear. Arrangements might have to be changed, appointments cancelled.
And yet apparently such has been the pervasiveness of these changes across the
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UK economy that for many workers there was, albeit begrudging, acceptance of
the inevitability of unsocial hours working. For example one Bankco employee
who had worked weekends reflected: ‘we wouldn’t mind doing one in four but
every weekend is quite hard. . .’ (Female full-time No. 4, Bankco).
Conclusion
Many of the assumptions over when staff work and the financial rewards they
receive for working unsocial hours no longer hold. The temporal boundary that
was erected as part of the emergence of post-World War II industrial relations
agreements in the UK has slowly but surely been eroded, as more and more of
economic activity takes place outside of the ‘standard’ working day. While
there have always been some jobs that have involved working ‘odd’ hours, such
as the nurses who staffed the accident and emergency wards at the local hospi-
tal, the security guards who looked over properties at night, and those in the
postal service who sorted through the letters for the morning delivery, recent
decades have seen a growth in the number of jobs – and hence the number of
workers – who are required to work early in the morning, late at nights, at week-
ends, or on bank holidays. There is less ‘time’ that is social, in the sense that it
is collective, where it can be expected that almost no one will be performing
paid work. It is in this wider context that our research illustrates some of the
smaller changes that go to make up these more general trends.
At five of our organizations – the partial exception being Bankco – we found
evidence of an intensification of the development of the employer-led working-
time model. In part this was due to managers paying more attention to the 
economics and organization of time as the basis for competition (Best, 1990).
Managers across the organizations appeared to share a common belief that it
was now possible to challenge traditional patterns of working-time organization
and to use this opportunity to make other changes in the wider employment rela-
tionship, for example through increasing the tempo of work or work intensity
and to remove the payments associated with unsocial hours. Moreover, for
many of the managers this process of change in working-time regimes was only
just beginning, with further changes towards flexible scheduling and flexible
working hours predicted both by management and by workers. There were clear
expectations among managers and the workforce that a process of transition
towards an employer-led model of working-time arrangements was underway,
and that it was not clear how it could be stopped. It is notable that these 
expectations were found in large organizations with, for the most part, continu-
ing trade union representation: that is, among those organizations which have 
up until now been the most likely to be constrained by the ‘traditional’ UK
working-time model.
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The change from this collective and regulated model to a more employer-
determined system of working-time arrangements involved radical changes in
Mediaco. The changes in the other organizations were less dramatic but often as
far-reaching. At each of the five other organizations – Bankco, Councilco,
Healthco, Retailco and Telecomco – the gradual erosion of norms and employ-
ment rights for established staff, coupled with the expansion of non-standard
employment forms, were behind a fundamental change in how managers and
workers talked about and understood ‘time’, inside and outside of the place of
work.
Changes since the end of the 1990s to both labour market conditions and to
public policy debate, with the increasing stress on the need to re-establish a 
better ‘work-life balance’ might suggest that this form of change may have 
fallen out of favour. This would be in line with evidence from national surveys
on work intensity that suggest that most of the pressure towards intensification
came in the early part of the decade – in line with the timing of changes in most
of our organizations (Green, 2001). The example of Bankco in our own research
certainly suggests that some organizations have had to reassess the viability and
sustainability of their new working-time systems and to retreat from the
employer-led model if they wish to maintain a motivated and committed work-
force. However, problematic human resource outcomes are not necessarily 
sufficient to induce subsequent change in managerial practice: employers have
historically had to be persuaded of the virtues of stable and regulated labour
markets, even if they later came to recognize their benefits (Jacoby, 1984), in
part because they do not willingly cede their unfettered right to manage.
Without new institutional arrangements, in the form of either collective or indi-
vidual employment rights, it cannot be guaranteed that managers would give
back the increased prerogative they have acquired to fix working-time arrange-
ments, and thereby to change the very temporal ordering of the society they are
part of. Reduced worker commitment, higher staff turnover rates or even 
pressure from social commentators and politicians over the sustainability of 
current work–life arrangements are not necessarily sufficient factors to induce
voluntary change in organizations’ work practices. Stops and starts may be
expected, but in the absence of a renewal of collective regulation in the UK, the
workforce needs to look to individual employee rights – associated with the
work–life balance debate in the UK and proposals to strengthen working-time
regulation in Europe and its implementation in the UK – if the process of transi-
tion from the UK system of working-time regulation is not to move the 
economy towards the employer-led model outlined in Table 1. This model –
based on the notion of free individual workers, unconstrained either by domes-
tic commitments or by their own requirements for a personal life – is increas-
ingly at odds with the needs of advanced societies as the shift towards dual 
earner households consolidates (Dex, 2002; Everingham, 2002). Re-regulation
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of the working-time system is essential both to rebalance power relations within
the employment relationship and to provide some compatibility between the
demands of work and personal and family life. Otherwise, societal sustainability
is likely to be further tested by the decisions of individual managers, who are
not held accountable for the wider systemic effects of their actions.
Notes
We are grateful to the Leverhulme Trust who funded the project upon which this
research draws. It is based on longitudinal case studies of seven large organizations
including one manufacturing company. However, the manufacturing company was not
included in this article, as transcripts of the employee interviews had not been completed
at the time the article was first drafted. The number of case studies was selected with 
reference in part to practical issues: namely, the number that we could reasonably expect
to include in a longitudinal project. However, the case studies were selected one from
each of seven sectors to represent roughly the employment mix of Britain. Within 
the labour market in which the studies were carried out in the North of England, each
organization could be said to be the dominant organization or market leader.
1. Of course, the constructing of temporal boundaries was not gender-neutral: ‘men and
women experienced this temporal divide differently. . . owing to their different rela-
tionship’ (Everingham, 2002: 338) to the public and the private spheres. 
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Appendix – Introducing the case-study organizations
• ‘Bankco’ is a major clearing bank in the UK employing around 3,700 staff. It has a
reputation for introducing new financial products in the sector and has been quick to
exploit the new technologies in information and telecommunications systems;
• ‘Councilco’ is a large urban city council. It has a total workforce of around 25,000.
Operations stretch across a range of activities, including school and civic catering,
community care, environmental health and indoor and outdoor leisure services;
• ‘Healthco’ is a large city centre NHS Trust, which combines the provision of acute
medical care with teaching and research activities and often acts as a tertiary referral
site. It employs a total of around 5,000 staff;
• ‘Mediaco’ consists of two companies in the newspaper industry – the editorial and
advertising offices of a local newspaper, together with the nearby printworks. The
newspaper offices are wholly owned by a large national media group; the printworks
operate under joint ownership with this and another national media group. Around x
employees work at the newspaper offices and y at the printworks; 
• ‘Retailco’ is one of the leading food retail chains in the UK, supplying a range of
around 40,000 products. With a total workforce of around 155,000, predominantly part
time, it is one of the largest private sector employers in the UK; 
• ‘Telecomco’ is one of the largest providers of telecommunications services in the UK,
providing a number of business and customer services, in addition to maintenance of
the telephone network. The total workforce stands at around 130,000. Development 
of mobile telephone services and the internet has recently contributed to high profit 
margins.
Note: all employment data refer to 1998.
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